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HAND-DELIVERED 
Mary T. Noonan, 
Clerk of the Court 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
230 South 500 East, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Petition for Rehearing in Johnson-Bowles v. Division of 
Securities, Case No. 90-00558-CA 
Dear Clerk of the Court: 
Relative to the above, this letter is submitted to 
Judges Orme, Russon, and Jackson in accordance with Rule 24(j), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, entitled "Citation of 
Supplemental Authorities." 
A new case recently issued out of the federal district 
court for the Southern District of New York entitled Jessup, 
Josephthal & Co. v. Piguet & Cie, (S.D.N.Y., August 21, 1991) 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 196,195 at p. 91,029, a copy of which is 
attached hereto, has a direct and favorable bearing on the 
Johnsons1 December 13, 1991, Petition for Rehearing. 
In the Johnsons1 December 13, 1991, Petition for 
Rehearing, the Johnsons point out that they cannot be held liable 
for the mere purchase of non-exempt stock simply because they 
were not, as a matter of law, In pari delicto with either their 
immediate sellers or those previous matters giving rise (in the 
first instance) to the Division's Summary Order of March 1, 1989. 
See p. 6, Petition for Rehearing (citing the U.S. Supreme Court's 
Pinter v. Dahl decision and Schanaveldt v. Noy-Burn, 347 P.2d 
553, 554 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1959). 
Mary T. Noonan, Clerk of the Court 
Page Two 
January 7, 1992 
While the Court in its November 29, 1991, decision cor-
rectly points out that Judge Greene ruled that Johnson-Bowles 
(not Mr. Johnson) knew or should have known of the 
"irregularities" respecting the stock of U.S.A. Medical (175 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 29 at p. 29, item 4), this is legally insufficient to 
hold the Johnsons liable under an aiding and abetting or iji pari 
delicto theory — the only basis upon which the final agency 
action can withstand analysis. 
While the attached decision is factually different, it 
does unequivocally hold that negligence, imprudence, stupidity or 
even recklessness (in this case, the mere making-of-a-market in 
U.S.A. Medical stock) are legally insufficient to trigger in pari 
delicto or aiding and abetting liability. 
feased on the foregoing, including the Johnsons1 Petition 
for Rehearing, no rational basis exists to uphold the Division's 
final agency action. 
JMCrca 
Encl. 
cc: David N. Sonnenreich, Esq. 
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[1196,195] Jesup, Josephthal & Co., Inc., et al. v. Piguet & Cie., et al. 
United States District Court, Southern District of New York. 90 Civ. 6544 (WK). August 21, 
1991. Opinion in full text. 
1. Exchange Act—Jurisdiction—Minimum Contacts.—A foreign bank charged with securi-
ties fraud was subject to jurisdiction in the district in which it maintained brokerage bank accounts. 
Although the bank had no offices in the United States, and was not authorized to conduct business 
here, by opening trading accounts it availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum state and invoked the benefits and protections of its laws. 
See 1f 26,540, "Exchange Act—Insiders; Recordkeeping; Clearance & Transfer" division, Vol-
ume 4. 
2. Exchange Act—Antifraud—Aiding and Abetting.—Allegations that a foreign bank 
assisted a trader's price manipulation scheme by representing to a brokerage firm that it would pay 
for the trader's purchase orders when it knew that he did not have the funds to cover the purchases 
were sufficient to state an aiding and abetting claim. Limited discovery would be permitted as to 
whether the representations were known by the bank to be false at the time they were made, and 
whether the bank's knowledge of the trader's fraudulent scheme could be inferred from its own 
trading activities in the stock in question. 
See f 22,721 and 22,725, "Exchange Act—Manipulations; National Market System" division, 
Volume 3. 
3. Exchange Act—Antifraud—Aiding and Abetting—In Pari Delicto Defense.—A bro-
kerage firm was not precluded from recovering on an aiding and abetting claim against a bank by its 
own claimed imprudence and negligence which allegedly caused its financial losses. The in pari 
delicto defense may be invoked only if the plaintiff has been an active, voluntary participant in the 
unlawful activity that is the subject of the suit. Mere stupidity or recklessness will not trigger this 
bar. 
See U 22,721 and 22,725, "Exchange Act—Manipulations; National Market System" division, 
Volume 3. 
Opinion of KNAPP, District Judge. 
By this complaint plaintiffs Jesup, Josephthal 
& Co., Inc. and Securities Settlement Corpora-
tion (hereinafter "plaintiff"), registered securi-
ties broker-dealers in the state of New York, 
allege, inter alia, that the defendants violated 
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa. On Janaury 16, 1991, 
plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) defendant Piguet & 
Cie, Banquiers (hereinafter, "Piguet") now 
moves to dismiss that complaint on the ground 
that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over 
it. In the alternative, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 
it moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. For the rea-
sons that follow, the motions are denied. 
Rule 12(b)(2) 
Because a determination that we do not have 
jurisdiction over Piguet would leave us without 
power to adjudicate any other matter relating to 
it, we first address this question. 
BACKGROUND 
Piguet is a private bank organized as a part-
nership under the laws of Switzerland with its 
1
 In opposition to the instant motion, plaintiff draws our 
attention to yet another account that Piguet has with a 
New York brokerage house, namely the "Cowen & Co 
account" which is nowhere mentioned in the complaint 
Plaintiff asserts that Piguet has engaged in substantial 
principal place of business in Switzerland. Plain-
tiff seeks to recover as against Piguet for its 
alleged involvement in a fraud perpetrated by 
defendant Paul Kutik (hereinafter "Kutik"), 
whom the complaint names as the primary 
wrongdoer. As discussed in greater detail infra, 
Piguet's alleged participation in this fraud 
arises from activities it performed in connection 
with a brokerage bank account it maintains at 
Morgan Guaranty Trust (hereinafter "Morgan 
Guaranty") in New York City. 
In support of its contention that we lack 
personal jurisdiction over it, Piguet informs us 
that it does not maintain offices in the United 
States and is not authorized to conduct business 
here. Its sole contacts with the United States are 
three brokerage bank accounts in New York: the 
above described Morgan Guaranty account, and 
one account each with the Philadelphia Interna-
tional Bank and the American Express Bank 
Limited. Piguet asserts that these accounts exist 
solely to facilitate international banking trans-
actions, including stock purchase transactions, 
and that it maintains these accounts primarily 
as a service to its customers. Def. Mem. p.24.1 
Although it does not dispute plaintiff's allega-
tion that some of the transactions in these 
trading in this account Piguet contests plaintiff's descrip-
tion of this account as a New York account asserting that 
this account was serviced by Cowen's office in Geneva, 
Switzerland See Def Reply Mem p 13 Since we find that 
on the facts pleaded in the complaint that we have personal 
Federal Securities Law Reports 1196,195 
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accounts are performed for the bank's own 
investment purposes, it contends that since the 
only alleged connection which these accounts 
have with the instant suit stems from activities 
it performed on behalf of its client, Kutik, "it 
would be unreasonable and unfair to subject [it] 
to the jurisdiction of this Court." Id. We disa-
gree. 
DISCUSSION 
It is well settled that personal jurisdiction 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
extends "to the full reach permitted by the due 
process clause." Perez-Rubio v. Wyckoff 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) 718 F.Supp. 217, 227. Accord-
ingly jurisdiction can be obtained over any 
defendant who has "certain minimum contacts 
with [the forum] such that the maintenance of 
this suit does not offend 'traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.' " Id. at 
227-228 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316). The inquiry is 
necessarily fact specific. Where, as here, juris-
diction is to be asserted over a defendant who is 
not present in the forum state but has caused an 
effect in the state by an act done elsewhere, due 
process requires that the court determine that 
the defendant's conduct was such that he 
"should reasonably anticipate being haled into 
court [in the forum state]" before the exercise of 
jurisdiction is proper. See Perez-Rubio, 718 
F.Supp. at 228 (citation omitted). 
Despite Piguet's recitation of the dearth of 
contacts it has with this forum, it is undisputed 
that it purchases and sells stock for its clients on 
a continuing basis through the above described 
correspondent bank accounts. It is also undis-
puted that the cause of action here asserted 
against it arises out of its alleged activities in 
one of these accounts, namely the account at 
Morgan Guaranty. Although Piguet strenuously 
argues that its activities with respect to the 
Morgan account here complained of were per-
formed on behalf of its client, and not itself, we 
find this fact to be of little relevance for by 
offering the services provided by these accounts 
to its clients, Piguet acts to inure to its own 
benefit. See Securities Exchange Commission v. 
Gilbert (1979) 82 F.R.D. 723, 725. By opening 
these accounts Piguet purposely chose to 
"[avail] itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State, thus invoking 
the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson 
v. Denckla (1957) 357 U.S. 235, 253. Thus, it is 
only reasonable to conclude that Piguet must 
"anticipate being haled into court" in New York 
for alleged illegal conduct it performed through 
these accounts. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297 ("When a 
(Footnote Continued) 
jurisdiction over Piguet we need not presently address the 
merits of this dispute. 
corporation 'purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum State' it has clear notice that it is subject 
to suit there"); see Gilbert, 82 F.R D at 725, 
726 (noting that personal jurisdiction was 
proper over Swiss bank whose only contact with 
New York was through four accounts main-
tained with three New York broker-dealers, 
since the cause of action sued upon arose out of 
the purchases and sales of stock in New York 
"which were not only the direct and foreseeable, 
but the intended "effects" of the bank's "acts" 
in Switzerland). Accordingly we find that in the 
circumstances before us the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over Piguet comports with tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice. Cf. Perez-Rubio, 718 F.Supp. at 227 ("On a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) . . . 
all doubts are to be resolved in the plaintiff's 
favor . . . a plaintiff need make out only a prima 
facie case of personal jurisdiction"). 
Rule 12(b)(6) 
In support of its motion to dismiss pursuant 
to 12(b)(6) Piguet makes two contentions. First 
it asserts that plaintiff has failed to plead fraud 
with particularity as required by Rule 9. Sec-
ond, it contends that plaintiff's actions were as 
egregious as its own, and therefore that the 
doctrine of pari delicto should bar plaintiff from 
recovering as against it. We shall address each 
of these contentions in turn. 
BACKGROUND 
The theory of the complaint is that defendant 
Paul Kutik (hereinafter "Kutik") schemed to 
inflate the value of Columbia Laboratories stock 
(hereinafter "Columbia") in violation of Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder. See 15 
U.S.C. §78j; 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5. In particu-
lar, the complaint alleges that Kutik placed buy 
orders for Columbia stock with various broker-
age houses with no intention of actually paying 
for the ordered shares. Plaintiff contends that 
Kutik's motivation for this fraud stems from the 
fact that he had secured substantial loans using 
Columbia shares as collateral, and that, accord-
ing to the terms of these loan agreements, he 
would be obligated to put up additional collat-
eral as security should the value of Columbia 
stock decline to below $9.00 a share. 
The gravamen of the claim against Piguet is 
that Piguet aided and abetted Kutik's scheme to 
manipulate the price of Columbia stock. The 
relevant facts of this claim are as follows. 
Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 3, 
1990, it was contacted by Kutik to open an 
1196,195 ©1991, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
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account on behalf of Dermar Panama, SA (here-
inafter, the "Dermar" account)2. Kutik 
informed plaintiff that he had authority to open 
this account and to direct trading activities 
therein on Dermar's behalf. In the following 
week, acting under Kutik's instructions, plain-
tiff purchased an aggregate of 80,500 shares of 
Columbia common stock for the Dermar 
account. Although Kutik represented that pay-
ment for said purchases would be prompt, no 
such payments were ever made. Compl. 1f 96. 
On August 14, at Kutik's request, plaintiff 
opened a second account, entitled the Farnell 
Holdings, Ltd. account (hereinafter the "Far-
nell" account)3. Pursuant to Kutik's instruc-
tions, plaintiff purchased an aggregate of 88,300 
shares of Columbia common stock for this 
account over the next week. 
After plaintiff made repeated demands for 
payment for the Dermar purchases, Kutik 
informed it that payment could be facilitated if 
it would transfer the stock which it had pur-
chased for the Dermar account to a new account 
entitled the "Dermar Morgan" account and des-
ignate Morgan Guaranty as the receiving agent 
for stock purchased for this new account. Kutik 
explained that his bank, Piguet, had an account 
at Morgan Guaranty, and that it would furnish 
the funds necessary to pay for the stock on a 
delivery versus payment basis. He assured 
plaintiff that at all times there would be suffi-
cient funds on deposit with Morgan Guaranty to 
pay for all transactions effected for this account. 
See id. at fl 102. 
Pursuant to this information, and at Kutik's 
instruction, plaintiff contacted Piguet and was 
informed that "both Kutik and Dermar were 
clients of Piguet and that arrangements were 
being made to make payment for the 80,500 
shares of Columbia stock which [would be] 
transferred to the Dermar Morgan account." 4 
Id. at U 107. Accordingly, on August 21, 1990, 
plaintiff opened the Dermar Morgan account. 
Between August 21 and August 27, plaintiff 
attempted to deliver to Morgan Guaranty the 
80,500 shares of Columbia stock now purchased 
on behalf of the Dermar Morgan account. Mor-
gan Guaranty, however, refused such delivery. 
Id. at H i l l , 112. 
Again pursuant to Kutik's instructions, on 
August 29, plaintiff opened a separate account 
entitled the "Farnell Morgan" account, desig-
2
 Dermar, a defendant in this action, is a Panama corpo-
ration with its principal place of business in Switzerland 
3
 Farnell, also a defendant, is a United Kingdom corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in Gibraltar 
4
 Paragraph 107 of the complaint states that "(Piguet] 
telephoned [plaintiff] prior to August 21, 1990, and con-
firmed that both Kutik and Dermar were clients of Piguet 
and that arrangements were being made to make payment 
nated Morgan Guaranty the receiving agent for 
this account, and transferred to it the stock 
previously purchased for the Farnell account. 
The complaint alleges that to confirm that pay-
ment arrangements were being made for this 
transferred stock, plaintiff again contacted 
Piguet, and was informed that Piguet would 
make immediate payment for "all of the Colum-
bia shares purchased for the various accounts 
maintained by Kutik . . . upon delivery of such 
securities to Morgan [Guaranty]." Id. at 
H 126, 127. 
At or about this time plaintiff, acting on 
Kutik's instructions, purchased an additional 
66,000 shares of Columbia stock for the Farnell 
Morgan account and transferred all stock then 
in the Dermar Morgan account to this Farnell 
Morgan account. Accordingly, by September 1 
plaintiff had purchased a total of 234,800 shares 
of Columbia stock for Kutik, all of which were 
held in the Farnell Morgan account. 
On several occasions between August 29 and 
September 7 plaintiff attempted to deliver the 
234,800 shares to Morgan Guaranty. However, 
Morgan Guaranty continued to refuse receipt of 
this stock. Id. at jf 132. 
The complaint alleges that thereafter Piguet 
was advised that the 234,800 shares presently 
held in the Farnell Morgan account would be 
resold due to nonpayment. In response, on Sep-
tember 7 Piguet represented to plaintiff that: 
[it] was in the process of making arrange-
ments for the payment for all of the full 
purchase price for all 234,000 [234,000] 
[shares] of Columbia stock held in the Farnell 
Morgan brokerage account, and that the pre-
vious delays preventing Morgan [Guaranty] 
from accepting delivery of said securities and 
tendering payment for same was due to 
problems encountered in transmitting the 
appropriate instructions to Morgan [Guar-
anty] for the conversion of Swiss Francs into 
U.S. Dollars for payment to [plaintiff] for the 
Columbia shares. 
Id. at 1J133. 
On September 10, Piguet did in fact forward 
to plaintiff $922,075.58 to pay for 100,000 of 
the 234,800 Columbia shares. Plaintiff alleges 
that in light of the September 7 conversation 
with Piguet it justifiably relied upon the fact 
that this was a partial payment and accordingly 
for the 80,500 shares of Columbia stock, which had been 
transferred to the Dermar Morgan Account, in cash, or by 
delivery of other negotiable securities, to Morgan " Since 
the complaint informs that the Dermar Morgan account 
was not opened until plaintiff had received this information 
we presume the language cited above was intended to be set 
forth in conditional terms 
Federal Securities Law Reports 1196,195 
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did not liquidate the remaining 134,800 shares. 
Id. at H 191. Thereafter, on September 19, 20, 
and 21, plaintiff's registered representative Jef-
frey Leach introduced Kutik to other broker-
dealers, with whom Kutik proceeded to place 
purchase orders for an additional 56,000 snares 
of Columbia stock. Piguet made no additional 
payments to plaintiff, and in the period of Sep-
tember 20 to December 6 plaintiff sold the 
remaining stock for $684,743. Plaintiff asserts 
that it suffered a loss of $509,958 on this trans-
action.5 
In support of its claim that Piguet aided and 
abetted Kutik's alleged illegal conduct, the com-
plaint specifically pleads "upon information and 
belief" that Piguet knew of the existence and 
purpose of Kutik's scheme to violate the securi-
ties laws, and that it rendered substantial assis-
tance to this scheme. See id. at H 188, 190. The 
complaint asserts that Piguet's knowledge of the 
underlying securities fraud perpetrated by 
Kutik can be inferred from the fact that Piguet, 
as Kutik's bank, "[knew] of Kutik's financial 
resources and concomitant inability to make 
payment" for the amount of shares he ordered. 
See id. at \ 189. The complaint does not, how-
ever, specifically state that at the time Piguet 
represented to plaintiff that it would pay for all 
shares, see id. at f 133, it knew that it's client 
would not be forwarding to it funds necessary to 
pay for said shares; nor does it allege that when 
Piguet asserted that it had had difficulty trans-
ferring Swiss francs into U.S. currency, see id., it 
knew this statement to be false. 
,' In its brief in opposition plaintiff offers an 
additional fact from which Piguet's knowledge 
of the alleged securities fraud might be inferred, 
namely that it itself owned a substantial num-
ber of shares of Columbia stock in August 1990, 
and that it engaged in substantial trading activ-
ity in this stock during the period of Kutik's 
alleged fraudulent scheme. See PI. Mem. at 20 
n.2; supra at 2, n.l. Plaintiff concedes, however, 
that this information is not pleaded in its com-
plaint. 
DISCUSSION 
Rule 9 
To state a claim for aider and abettor liability 
under Section 10(b) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 a plaintiff must allege 
sufficient facts to demonstrate: (1) the existence 
of a securities law violation by the primary 
party; (2) knowledge of the violation by the 
5
 $509,958 represents the difference between the price 
plaintiff originally paid for the shares namely 2,116,777 and 
the price it received from this delayed sale. 
6
 For purposes of this motion, Piguet assumes that the 
allegations in the Amended Complaint are sufficient to 
allege securities laws violations by Kutik. See Def Mem at 
14 n 7. 
II 96,195 
aider and abettor; and (3) substantial assistance 
by the aider and abettor in achievement of the 
primary violation. Armstrong v. McAlpin (2d 
Cir. 1983) 699 F.2d 79, 91. In support of this 
motion to dismiss, Piguet contends that the alle-
gations of the complaint are insufficient to prop-
erly plead factors (2) and (3).6 
With respect to factor (3) Piguet contends 
that as a matter of law its three conversations 
with plaintiff do not constitute "substantial 
assistance". Def. Mem at 20. We disagree. The 
success of Kutik's alleged scheme artificially to 
inflate the price of Columbia stock was depen-
dent on his ability to induce plaintiff to 
purchase shares on his behalf, over a period of 
time. We can not say as a matter of law that no 
reasonable juror could conclude that Piguet's 
affirmative statement to plaintiff that it would 
pay for all shares ordered by Kutik did not 
substantially assist Kutik in this task. Accord-
ingly, we turn to the question of whether or not 
plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to establish 
that Piguet knew that Kutik was engaged in a 
scheme to violate the securities laws. 
Citing Rule 9 7, Piguet contends that even if 
we were to assume that it knew that its client 
Kutik did not have the funds at hand to pay for 
the stock he was instructing plaintiff to 
purchase, it by no means follows that it would 
have known—or even should necessarily have 
suspected—that Kutik was entering orders 
which he did not hope to be able to cover. 
Rather, it contends that it is only logical to infer 
that it assumed Kutik would in due course pro-
vide the necessary funds for his purchases. In 
support of this argument, Piguet draws our 
attention to the absence of any allegation by 
plaintiff that any statements it made to plain-
tiff were "knowinglv false" when made. See 
5/30/91 Tr. at 24. 
At first glance we found these arguments per-
suasive. However, at oral argument plaintiff 
informed us that it did not affirmatively plead 
that Piguet made false statements precisely 
because the information necessary to plead such 
an allegation is exclusively within Piguet's pos-
session. In particular, plaintiff argued that 
whether or not Piguet had in fact had difficulty 
transferring Swiss francs to U.S. dollars, or had 
made any efforts whatsoever prior to September 
10 to pay for any of the stock ordered by Kutik, 
were facts known only to Piguet and could be 
substantiated only through discovery. See id. at 
23-28. 
Rule 9 provides: 
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particu-
larity. Malice, intent, knowledge, or other conditions of a 
mind of a person may be averred generally. 
©1991, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
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Although Rule 9 requires that allegations of 
fraud be pleaded with particularity, it specifi-
cally provides that "[mjalice, intent, knowledge, 
or other conditions of a mind of a person may be 
averred generally ,\ In Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex 
Hospital Trustees (1975) 425 U.S. 738, 746, the 
Supreme Court observed that: 
'[A] complaint should not be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts in support of his claim which 
would entitle him to relief.' Conley v. Gibson, 
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) . . . And in . . . 
cases, where 'the proof is largely in the hands 
of the alleged conspirators/ Poller v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting, 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962), 
dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample 
opportunity for discovery should be granted 
very sparingly. 
Having reviewed all of the allegations of the 
complaint, as well as the briefs submitted in 
relation to the instant motions, we can not say 
that plaintiff can not prove any set of facts in 
support of its claim that Piguet knew of Kutik's 
scheme to violate the securities laws and, 
accordingly, that it aided and abetted him in 
this task. Cf. Ouaknine v. MacFarlane (2d Cir. 
1990) 897 F.2d 75, 80-81 (" [p]lausible allega-
tions that defendants made specific promises to 
induce a securities transaction while secretly 
intending not to carry them out or knowing they 
could not be carried out, and that they were not 
carried out, are sufficient. . . to state a claim for 
relief under Section 10(b)' " (citations omitted)). 
Accordingly, pursuant to the teaching of Hospi-
tal Bldg. Co., we presently deny Piguet's motion 
to dismiss for failure to plead fraud with partic-
ularity, and grant plaintiff limited discovery on 
the following two issues: (1) whether or not 
statements which Piguet made to plaintiff dur-
ing any of the three above discussed conversa-
tions were known by Piguet to be false at the 
time they were made, and (2) whether—or to 
what extent—Piguet's knowledge of Kutik's 
fraudulent scheme can be inferred from its own 
trading activities in the shares of Columbia 
stock it owned. Piguet may, of course, renew this 
motion to dismiss at the close of discovery on 
these issues. Pfaintiff, if so advised, may in the 
interim file a second amended complaint. 
In pari delicto 
As an alternative ground for dismissing the 
complaint, Piguet asserts that even if the plain-
tiff could allege a valid aiding and abetting 
claim, the doctrine of in pari delicto should 
preclude it from recovering on this claim 
because it was plaintiffs own imprudence and 
negligence which caused it to suffer the finan-
cial loss here asserted. See 5/30/91 Tr. at 28. In 
support of this claim, Piguet cites the facts that 
plaintiff, a sophisticated broker-dealer, pro-
ceeded to permit Kutik to order an aggregate of 
234,800 shares of Columbia stock over a period 
of less than six weeks without ever having paid 
one cent for said purchases, and it even "aided" 
Kutik in his purchase of an additional 56,000 
Columbia shares by introducing him to other 
broker-dealers even though it, itself, had never 
been paid for any of the stock Kutik ordered 
purchased. 
The common law defense of in pari delicto 
prohibits a plaintiff from recovering only if he 
"is as guilty of wrongdoing as the party he 
accuses." Ross v. Bolton, (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 639 
F.Supp. 323, 328 citing MaJlis v. Bankers Trust, 
(2d Cir. 1980) 615 F.2d 68, 76 cert, denied, 
(1981) 449 U.S. 1123, 101 S. Ct. 938, 67 
L.Ed.2d 109. Mere stupidity, or even reckless-
ness, will not suffice to trigger this bar. As the 
Court in Pinter v. Dahl (1988) 486 U.S. 622, 
636 stated: 
The plaintiff must be an active, voluntary 
participant in the unlawful activity that is 
the subject of the suit. 'Plaintiffs who are 
truly in pari delicto are those who have them-
selves violated the law in cooperation with the 
defendant'. Unless the degrees of fault are 
essentially indistinguishable or the plaintiff's 
responsibility is clearly greater, the in pari 
delicto defense should not be allowed, and the 
plaintiff should be compensated, (citations 
omitted). 
On the facts presently before us, we can not 
conclude that this affirmative defense will inevi-
tably bar plaintiff from recovering against 
Piguet. Piguet does not claim that plaintiff 
knew of Kutik's fraudulent scheme nor does it 
assert that plaintiffs actions to accommodate 
Kutik's requests to purchase stock were in any 
way unlawful. Accordingly, the motion to dis-
miss on this ground is denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Piguet's motions to dismiss are denied. It is 
granted leave to renew that portion of its Rule 
12(b)(6) motion specified above after discovery 
on the issues outlined is completed or after a 
reasonable period of time has passed. Plaintiff is 
granted leave to file a second amended com-
plaint, if it be so advised. 
SO ORDERED. 
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